Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cowles Foundation

6-1-2006

Efficient Recommender Systems
Dirk Bergemann
Deran Ozmen

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Ozmen, Deran, "Efficient Recommender Systems" (2006). Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers. 1859.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/1859

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

EFFICIENT RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS

By
Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen

June 2006

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1568

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

E cient Recommender Systems
Dirk Bergemann
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06511
dirk.bergemann@yale.edu

Deran Ozmen
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06511
deran.ozmen@yale.edu

April 2006
Extended Abstract

Abstract

a simple recommender system and a competitive fringe
with no such system, to analyze the surplus created by
recommender system. This paper takes an e ciency
point of view and investigates how that surplus could be
maximized.

We study the e cient allocation of buyers in the presence of recommender systems. A recommender system
a ects the market in two ways: (i) it creates value by reducing product uncertainty for the customers and hence
(ii) its recommendations can be o ered as add-ons, which
generates informational externalities. We investigate the
impact of these factors on the e cient allocation of buyers
across di erent products.
We nd that the e cient allocation requires that the
seller with the recommender system has full market share.
If the recommender system is su ciently e ective in reducing uncertainty, it is optimal to have some products
to be purchased by a larger group of people than others. The large group consists of customers with exible
tastes.

1

There are usually two sources of uncertainty involved
in the decision process of a customer. She may be unsure
about her tastes and/or characteristics of the products.
In our model, we focus only on product uncertainty in
the on-line market for horizontally di erentiated products, where the di erence in customers' tastes translate
into di erences in the willingness to pay for decreased uncertainty. Our recommender system acts as a mechanism
that collects customer evaluations, through which the
seller infers more information about the products. The
seller reveals whatever inference he makes to his \loyal"
customers, those who have made a purchase from him
before. Thus, a loyal customer has the chance to make a
more informed choice using the inference revealed to her
by the recommender system.

Introduction

The large volume of transactions on the internet gives
rise to a large accumulation of data about customers and
products. This enables internet sellers to build databases
that consist of personalized data on all their customers,
the customers' past purchases and the feedback from
those purchases. In this paper we analyze one speci c use
of the accumulated information, \recommender systems".
A recommender system is a software program which uses
the accumulated data to make statistical inferences about
what product a particular customer would like when she
returns to the website.
From an economic point of view, a recommender system represents an informational linkage that creates additional surplus by reducing uncertainty for the customers.
In this paper we present a two-period, two-product model
that describes the interaction between a seller employing

As we mentioned above, a recommendation can be considered as an add-on: it is an additional service a customer receives on top of the purchase she makes. Recommendations, however, are di erent from typical add-ons
and bundle elements because their quality is determined
endogenously by the information accumulated through
the seller's sales. Thus the e ciency problem of what
market share each seller should have entails informational
externalities. These externalities can be separated into
two elements. The rst element is what we call the \volume externality". This externality represents the general
coordination element inherent in the problem, which is
that as the seller has more customers, he will be able
to make better recommendations. This element determines how much of the market the seller should capture
to maximize the surplus. The second one is the \product
1

externality". This externality relates to the distribution
of buyers within one seller over di erent products. If there
are a lot of customers buying one particular product in
one period, it might be worth having other customers delay the purchase of that product and purchase the other
products for that period. The strength of this e ect determines whether equal amounts of information should
be accumulated on each product or whether there are increasing returns to information so that a large volume
of buyers should be induced to buy some products and
provide information at the expense of other products on
which smaller volume of information is gathered. In the
model, the customers di er both in the type of product
they prefer and in the intensity of their preferences. Some
buyers are more exible in their choices than others. It is
the buyers with in exible tastes who really bene t from
the recommendation service.
Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser (1999) consider a recommender system with a single product and sequential
choice. Ansari, Essegaier and Kohli (2000) describe and
compare methods of prediction which range from classic
linear regression to Bayesian methods.

by l and h, arrive at both sellers. These products are differentiated with respect to the priors attached to them.
Let xi 2 f 1; 1g be the true type of product i 2 fl; hg
and i Pr (xi = 1). The two products arrive with symmetric uncertainty:
h
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1
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1
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where " 2 0; 21 . The initial priors are di erentiated by
", which we refer to as \initial information".
In period 1 a new product, m, arrives with prior m 2
f l ; h g at all sellers. In period 0, neither the buyers nor
the sellers know what the exact value of m will be in
period 1, but they attach 12 probability to m being h
and l . The time-line is presented below.

Period 0

Period 1

Two products

Prices

Decisions

Evaluations

New product

Prices

Decisions

arrive

announced

made

collected

arrives

announced

made

Recommendations
made
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Model

Market The supply side of the market consists of a
seller with a recommender system, denoted by M; and a
competitive fringe of sellers with no recommender system,
denoted by F . The demand side consists of a continuum
of buyers, and each buyer has a choice between one of
two products. Each buyer is characterized by his preference parameter which is distributed uniformly over
[ 1; 1]. The products are denoted by x 2 f 1; 1g. The
gross utility of a buyer of type is speci ed by:
u ( ; x) = v

(

2

x) :

Figure 1: Timeline

Learning Between periods 0 and 1 seller M receives information form his buyers. We aggregate the information
as follows: Let i denote the measure of buyers who buy
product i 2 fl; hg from seller M in period 0. Seller M
receives a random signal yi (xi ) 2 f 1; 0; 1g on the type
of each product i 2 fl; hg between periods 0 and 1, where

(1)

Pr (yi (xi ) = 0 j xi ) = 1
Pr (yi (xi ) 2 f 1; 1g j xi ) =
i

i

As an example consider the product line to be books.
Then the two types of the product can represent \mystery" versus \romance" novels. We can consider the buyers with preference parameters close to 1 or 1 as \in exible" and buyers with preference parameter close to 0 as
\ exible", because the former group would insist on their
favorite kind of book whereas the latter group would not
be adverse to trying other kinds.

We can interpret a signal of 0 as containing no information, or simply the failure to receive an informative signal.
Given that the seller receives a relevant signal, the probability of the signal being correct is:

Timing and Choices In each period new products arrive and there is some uncertainty about their characteristics. The sellers and buyers share a common prior on
these products' types. In period 0 two products, denoted

where 2 0; 12 . We interpret as the informativeness
of the signal. Given the probabilistic structure, we view
the recommender system as a mechanism that computes
the posterior beliefs for each product i based on the signal

Pr (yi (xi ) = xi j yi (xi ) 2 f 1; 1g ; xi ) =

2

1
+ ;
2

yi and reports them only to the buyers who have bought
We would like to investigate whether it can be optimal
from him in period 0. The posterior for product i given to create endogenous di erentiation through unbalanced
signal yi will be denoted by
distributions. If the distribution is unbalanced, one product is experimented by a larger group of buyers and the
Pr (xi = 1 j yi ) :
i (yi )
small group of buyers wait to bene t from their feedback.
If this is the case, then it is also important for e ciency
Interpretation There are two products arriving with to know the composition of these groups. This suggests
symmetric uncertainty attached in period 0. A high " the following de nition.
means there is less uncertainty about each product's type
and that the two products are highly di erentiated. A De nition 2 (SORTING)
low " means uncertainty is high for both products and A distribution of buyers ( l ; h ) is:
that initially the two products look similar. On the other
1. \sorted" if the set of buyers selecting products l and
hand, represents the informativeness of the signal. We
h are line segments of the form [ 1; x] and [x; 1];
interpret :
(3)
= ;
2. \shu ed " if i > j for some i 2 fl; hg and the set
"
of buyers selecting product j consists of two segments
as the \performance" of the recommender system.
S ; S + of the forms [ 1; x], [y; 1]. The degree of
shu ing is:
min fjS j ; jS + jg
;
3 Social E ciency
max fjS j ; jS + jg
In this section we analyze the e cient assignment problem of how to distribute buyers over di erent sellers and
products in order to maximize total surplus.
In the absence of a recommender system, the e cient
allocation in period 0 is straightforward. Each buyer
should be allocated to the product that gives her the highest per period utility, i.e. all buyers with > 0 should buy
product h and all buyers with < 0 should buy version
l. Notice that the seller choice does not matter in this
case, because there is no di erence between the service
provided by di erent sellers.
If we introduce uncertainty and information, it is no
longer true that each buyer should buy the product which
gives her the highest per period expected utility, because
a buyer's choice of seller and product in period 0 a ects
the utility of all the other buyers in period 1. There are
two variables which in uence the informational externality: (i) the distribution of buyers over sellers M and F
and (ii) the distribution of buyers over the two di erent
products. The rst variable is important because it determines the aggregate information gathered by seller M and
thus the overall e ectiveness of the recommender system
in reducing uncertainty. It is clear that all buyers should
purchase from seller M in period 0 because information
has positive value and the in ow of information is maximized when seller M has full market share. Therefore,
we ignore the fringe in the remaining analysis.
De nition 1 (BALANCE)
A distribution of buyers with ( h ; l ) is balanced if
l and unbalanced if i > j for some i 2 fl; hg.

h

3. \perfectly shu ed" if jS j = jS + j.
-1

1

h

l
SORTED

-1

l

1

h

l

SHUFFLED

Figure 2: Sorting and Shu ing for

h

>

l

If a distribution is shu ed, it is the in exible buyers of
both types that bene t more from the endogenous di erentiation created by the unbalanced distribution. On the
other hand, if a distribution is sorted, it is usually the inexible buyers of one type receiving information from the
experiences of all other buyers. The individual preference
of a buyer becomes increasingly in uential in the determination of the social surplus as the buyer's type moves
further away from 0. Therefore, knowing the preference
ranking of each buyer over the two products is essential to
nding the right balance between the individual buyers'
interests and the society's interest, which determines the
e cient solution.
In the analysis of the e cient distribution ( l ; h ), we
= have to be aware of the fact that the ranking of the utilities from the two products might change as we change
3

( l ; h ). The preference ranking between h and l depends Proposition 2 (COMPARATIVE STATICS)
on the di erence between j h
l j. For example, if h
1. At = s , the degree of unbalance and the degree of
is su ciently greater than l , then even the buyers who
shu ing increase discontinuously.
would prefer product h in a static world, i.e. the buyers
with > 0, get a higher two-period utility from product
2. For
> s , the degree of unbalance and shu ing
l than product h.
increase in .
It is also clear that once we restrict attention to full
3. As ! 1, the distribution for both e cient allocamarket share distributions, the only balanced distributions becomes perfectly shu ed.
tion is 21 ; 12 , where the rankings are in accordance with
the static preferences. However, there could be di erent
As information becomes more valuable it is bene cial
preference rankings over h and l when the distribution
to increase the degree of unbalance and place a higher
is unbalanced with l < h . Next we consider optimal
burden on exible buyers. As there is more that the recshu ed distributions.
ommender system can contribute, the in exible buyers
increasingly have more to gain than exible buyers.
Lemma 1 If a shu ed distribution with ( h ; l ) is e +
cient, then jS j 7 jS j as h 7 l .

4

In other words, if it is e cient for some positive types
to purchase product l, then it has to be the case that
there are more negative types purchasing l.

Conclusion

We have shown how the existence of a recommender system creates additional surplus and introduces informational externalities into the problem of optimally disProposition 1 (EFFICIENCY)
tributing the buyers over di erent products. If the recIn the e cient allocation seller M has a full market share ommender system's output were independent of the sales,
and there is a unique s > 3 such that:
then buyers would be optimally allocated to the products
in line with their static preferences. As the information
1. for 6 s , the unique e cient distribution of buyers produced by the recommender system is endogenously
is balanced and sorted;
determined through the sales, it is not always optimal
to allocate the buyers according to their static prefer2. for s < < 1, there are two symmetric e cient
ences. Typically, the future gains of the in exible buyers
distributions of buyers that are unbalanced and immore than o set the current losses of the exible buyperfectly shu ed.
ers. As the information produced by the recommender
system becomes more valuable, more exible buyers will
acquire information to improve the future consumption
-1
0
1
choice of the in exible buyers. Finally. in related work,
Bergemann and Ozmen (2006) analyze how a pro t maxl
h
ρ≤ρ
imizing seller can use a recommender system to improve
-1
1
its revenue management.
s

l

h

l
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